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ABSTRACT
Apple Wireless Direct Link (AWDL) is a proprietary and un-
documented IEEE 802.11-based ad hoc protocol. Apple first
introduced AWDL around 2014 and has since integrated it
into its entire product line, including iPhone and Mac. While
we have found that AWDL drives popular applications such
as AirPlay and AirDrop on more than one billion end-user
devices, neither the protocol itself nor potential security and
Wi-Fi coexistence issues have been studied. In this paper, we
present the operation of the protocol as the result of binary
and runtime analysis. In short, each AWDL node announces a
sequence of Availability Windows (AWs) indicating its readi-
ness to communicate with other AWDL nodes. An elected
master node synchronizes these sequences. Outside the AWs,
nodes can tune their Wi-Fi radio to a different channel to
communicate with an access point, or could turn it off to
save energy. Based on our analysis, we conduct experiments
to study the master election process, synchronization accu-
racy, channel hopping dynamics, and achievable throughput.
We conduct a preliminary security assessment and publish
an open source Wireshark dissector for AWDL to nourish
future work.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Networks → Network protocol design; Ad hoc net-
works; Link-layer protocols;
KEYWORDS
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1 INTRODUCTION
Apple Wireless Direct Link (AWDL) is a proprietary protocol
deployed in about 1.2 billion1 end-user devices consisting
of Apple’s main product families such as Mac, iPhone, iPad,
Apple Watch, and Apple TV—effectively all recent Apple de-
vices containing a Wi-Fi chip. Apple does not advertise the
protocol but only vaguely refers to it as a “peer-to-peer Wi-
Fi” technology [5, 6]. Yet, it empowers popular applications
such as AirDrop and AirPlay that transparently use AWDL
without the user noticing. We believe that public knowledge
of this undocumented protocol would be beneficial for the
following reasons: First, since AWDL is based on IEEE 802.11,
there are potential performance and co-existence issues that
need to be identified. This is especially important in reg-
ulated environments as AWDL uses various channels and
employs a channel hopping mechanism that might inter-
fere with corporate Wi-Fi deployments. Second, the Wi-Fi
driver (where AWDL is implemented) is the largest binary
kernel extension in current versions of macOS. Given the re-
cently published vulnerabilities in Wi-Fi chip firmware [7, 8]
that might lead to full system compromise [9], we highly
recommend a security audit of the protocol and its imple-
mentations as vulnerabilities in non-standardized protocols
are even more likely to occur. For example, protocol fuzzing
requires knowledge of the frame format. Third, an open
re-implementation of the protocol would allow interoper-
ability with other operating systems, eventually enabling
high-throughput cross-platform direct communication. Such
technology is required, for example, in smartphone-based
emergency communication applications [21, 25].
To maximize the impact for the research community, we
have lifted a layer in Apple’s ecosystem and unveiled an
1Based on unit sales for iPhone, iPad, and Mac since 2014 [4].
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existing yet obscure wireless ad hoc protocol. In this pa-
per, we conduct a comprehensive investigation on AWDL
by means of binary and runtime analysis, and present its
frame format and operation. In short, AWDL is based on the
IEEE 802.11 standard and makes use of vendor-specific ex-
tensions that allow custom protocol implementations. Each
AWDL node periodically emits custom action frames con-
taining a sequence of Availability Windows (AWs) indicating
its readiness to communicate with other AWDL nodes. An
elected master node synchronizes these sequences. Within
these AWs, nodes are able to communicate with their neigh-
bors using a dedicated data frame format. Outside the AWs,
nodes can tune their Wi-Fi radio to a different channel to
communicate with an access point, or turn it off to save
energy. We summarize our main contributions:
• We provide insights into the macOS operating sys-
tem and its Wi-Fi driver architecture and debugging
facilities to help future research endeavors (Section 3).
• We present the AWDL frame format and operation in
detail (Sections 4 to 6).
• We conduct an experimental analysis of AWDL to
assess election behavior, synchronization accuracy,
throughput, and channel hopping strategies (Section 7).
• We discuss protocol complexity, energy efficiency, and
perform a preliminary security assessment where we
report a security permission problem in a macOS ker-
nel extension (Section 8).
• We publish an open source AWDL Wireshark dissec-
tor [23].
Furthermore, we give background on related direct wireless
communication technologies in Section 2 and conclude this
work in Section 9.
2 BACKGROUND
AWDL has been referenced in several patents such as [24]
and can be classified as a wireless ad hoc protocol which
allows peers to communicate directly with each other. There
exist already a number of other technologies which we sum-
marize in the following.
IEEE 802.11 IBSS. The IBSS mode commonly known as “ad
hoc” mode creates a distributed wireless network without
special controller roles. An IBSS is created by sending bea-
con frames with an SSID and BSSID on a particular channel.
Other nodes joining the network will send out beacons them-
selves using the same information. The mode is robust to
nodes leaving the network as all nodes broadcast beacons.
The nodes do not require any further synchronization. How-
ever, IBSS has never become widely deployed, mostly due to
lack of efficient power saving mechanisms, which are crucial
for mobile devices [11]. Flawed implementations are another
common problem [29]. IBSS is not supported on Android
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Figure 1: Interaction of differentmacOS processes and
frameworks used for controlling AWDL.
and Microsoft announced it might not be available in future
versions of Windows [27]. On Apple’s operating systems en-
cryption is not supported and iOS only allows to join existing
IBSS networks.
Wi-Fi Peer-to-Peer.Wi-Fi P2P [36], also known under its
certification name Wi-Fi Direct2, allows connecting multiple
devices directly without a base station. During operation, one
node assumes the role of a Group Owner (GO) which closely
resembles infrastructure (or BSS) operation. It is not possible
to migrate the role of the GO to another device: if the GO
leaves the network, a new network must be created. Wi-Fi
P2P connections are established by listening on one chan-
nel and sending probe requests on all channels. This delays
the connection process in practice. Experiments show that
establishing a connection takes from four to more than ten
seconds [11]. Discovering devices thus drains their battery
very fast.
Tunneled Direct Link Setup. Tunneled Direct Link Setup
(TDLS) is an IEEE 802.11 extension that enables direct com-
munication between two nodes in the same BSS. In networks
without TDLS, all traffic passes the Access Point (AP) even
when the two communicating nodes are within communica-
tion range. TDLS requires both nodes to be connected to the
2The Wi-Fi Alliance is a vendor association which holds the Wi-Fi trade-
mark for IEEE 802.11-based technologies and certifies products using the
specification. Although the Wi-Fi Alliance does not formally create the
standard, their certification has relevance in the market. The alliance also
creates their own standards based on IEEE 802.11 such as P2P and NAN.
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same AP since control frames are tunneled through the AP
and, thus, cannot be used in real ad hoc scenarios.
Neighbor Awareness Networking. Neighbor Aware Net-
working (NAN) [35], also known as Wi-Fi Aware, extends
IEEE 802.11 with proximity service discovery. NAN is de-
signed to be energy efficient, allowing continuous operation
on battery-powered devices [12]. NAN is supported in An-
droid 8 [17], but we did not find any devices with compatible
hardware. NAN depends on beacon frames sent from an
elected master. These synchronize the timing of all devices
in an area. During a short discovery window the master sets,
devices can turn their radio on, exchange service and connec-
tion information (e.g., parameters for Wi-Fi P2P) and turn
their radio off again. In fact, we found that AWDL employs
similar concepts as NAN, but the actual implementation dif-
fers strongly from that of NAN. In addition, NAN does not
feature a data path for transmission of user data.
Bluetooth. Bluetooth [10] is a separate standard with differ-
ent PHY and MAC layers. Bluetooth operates in the 2.4 GHz
band as Wi-Fi and is often integrated into the Wi-Fi chip
to share the same antennas. Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE)
is incompatible with classic Bluetooth and is optimized for
low energy consumption and, therefore, offers limited band-
width. The usable maximum BLE 4.2 data rate is 394 kbit/s
[14]. It is commonly implemented in small battery-powered
devices such as smartwatches and fitness trackers. BLE is
not designed for large data transfers but can be used for
bootstrapping high-bandwidth links such as AWDL.
3 METHODOLOGY
Reverse engineering is more of an art than a science and,
hence, it is hard to write generic recipes. Nevertheless, we
structure our methodology for reversing closed-source net-
work protocols with a focus on the macOS operating sys-
tem so that it can be used in related research endeavors. In
the following, we describe how binary and dynamic run-
time analysis in tandem can result in full disclosure of the
workings of a complex wireless network protocol. Previous
exemplary works have reverse engineered the Skype proto-
col [26], Broadcom Wi-Fi chip firmware [28], and the Fitbit
ecosystem [13].
3.1 Binary Analysis
We analyzed numerous binaries related to AWDL to finally
find those parts that implement the protocol. We first illus-
trate our selection process and then discuss the two-part
Wi-Fi driver which implements most of the AWDL protocol
stack. We focus our analysis on macOS and assume that the
architecture is in principle similar to that of iOS. We used a
decompiler to analyze the target binaries.
Binary Selection. Apple excessively uses frameworks and
daemons in its OSes. Consequently, there are numerous de-
pendencies which result in a complex binary selection pro-
cess. Frameworks offer an API to their corresponding sin-
gleton daemons and can be used by other daemons and pro-
cesses. We started off by crawling the system for binaries
that had “802.11”, “Multicast DNS (mDNS),” or “sharing” in
their names. We found more related targets by following
dependencies. We show part of the discovered dependen-
cies and interactions in Fig. 1. While there are user-facing
binaries such as the sharingd daemon, the most relevant
binaries reside in the kernel, in particular, the generic Wi-
Fi driver IO80211Family and the device-specific variants
AirportBrcm4360 and AirportBrcmNIC. Each of them in-
cludes hundreds of AWDL-related functions, suggesting that
the bulk of the protocol stack is implemented here. We found
that IO80211Family takes care of most of the AWDL frame
parsing and creation as well as maintaining the AWDL state
machine. The device-specific driver handles time-critical
functions such as synchronization. As both driver parts are
among the largest kernel extensions present in macOS , un-
derstanding internal driver structures were key to make
sense of the decompiled code.
Finding Interesting Code Segments. Due to the size of
the macOS Wi-Fi driver, we needed to quickly find functions
that would implement part of the AWDL protocol. Fortu-
nately, Apple does not strip symbol names from their bina-
ries, such that searching for “awdl” in the symbol table (e. g.,
using nm) results in a number of hits. Some of those symbols
additionally contain “parse” and “TLV” in their name (e. g.
parseAwdlSyncTreeTLV) which helped us understand the
calculation of some Type-Length-Value (TLV) fields. Further-
more, debug log statements give hints about the purpose of a
code segment inside a function. Therefore, we can search for
debugging strings and their cross-references to find details
such as the misalignment threshold in Section 6.2.
LeakedBroadcomDriver SourceCode.As another source
of information, we used a dated Broadcom Wi-Fi driver
whose source code was leaked [15]. We found several refer-
ences to AWDL in the source code but none of the core func-
tionality.We suspect that Broadcom uses a modular firmware
concept with one central repository for a wide range of fea-
tures. Special features such as AWDL are made available
selectively to their customers such as Apple. More important
than the references to AWDL are some C structs found in the
source code. These include key structures such as the Syn-
chronization Parameters TLV and Channel Sequence TLV
(more in Section 5). The leaked code also contains the source
code for the wl utility, which provides debugging features
for the driver and is further discussed in Section 3.2.
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Figure 2: Screenshot of our Wireshark dissector.
Dissecting Structures. To understand the driver’s func-
tions, we needed to reconstruct the underlying data struc-
tures. The leaked source code shows that most of the AWDL-
related functions use an awdl_info struct as a first param-
eter. The wlc_dump_awdl function prints internal data in a
readable format and, thus, was an ideal target to reconstruct
the internal structures as shown below:
bcm_bprintf(a2, "AWDL master home channel = %d\n",
awdl_info->master_home_channel);
The result of our binary analysis was a complete Wireshark
dissector for AWDL that we also used for the dynamic anal-
ysis of the protocol and for evaluating our experiments. We
show our dissector in Fig. 2.
3.2 Runtime Analysis
The complete protocol operation was difficult to compre-
hend with the binary analysis alone. To understand the se-
mantics of synchronization, election, service discovery, and
data path, we complemented our static analysis with a dy-
namic approach. In this section, we discuss dedicated macOS
logging and debugging facilities that helped to analyze the
protocol. In particular, we used the Console application, the
ioctl interface, the leaked Broadcom wl utility, as well as
Apple’s undocumented CoreCapture framework. The latter
is especially verbose but required us to write an additional
dissector for Wireshark as it uses a private data format.
Apple Console. The Console program is the central place
to access logs since macOS 10.12 and includes debug mes-
sages from the kernel. To receive verbose output from the
Wi-Fi driver, we increased the log level using custom boot
arguments which we found by searching for references to
the PE_parse_boot_arg function in the Wi-Fi driver. The
following boot arguments maximize the driver’s debug out-
put:
nvram boot-args="debug=0x10000 \
awdl_log_flags=0xffffffffffffffff \
awdl_log_flags_verbose=0xffffffffffffffff \
awdl_log_flags_config=1 wlan.debug.enable=0xff"
With the increased log level, Console shows additional in-
formation such as state transitions and the current channel
sequence:
IO80211Family <...> com.apple.p2p: AWDL ON: [infra
↪→ (100) 72%], (6/44/44) [44 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 44
↪→ 44 0 0 0 0 0] Low Power
ioctl Interface. ioctl system calls are a standard way to
communicate with devices on Unix-based systems. Apple
uses ioctls to configure wireless interfaces such as associ-
ating with an AP or creating an IBSS. Apple provides the
header files with the request format, the available request
types, and the data structures for macOS 10.5. These old
header files can be brought up to date using information
from the binary analysis. The apple80211VirtualRequest
method contains calls to all handler functions. Out of the
available 72 request IDs, 40 relate to AWDL. These requests
can set several parameters in the driver. Especially useful
is the card-specific ioctl. It allows wrapping a Broadcom-
specific ioctl inside an Apple ioctl, providing us with a
direct interface with the Broadcom driver. Note that it is
no longer possible to send Broadcom-specific ioctls since
Apple fixed our reported vulnerability (Section 8): the dri-
ver now checks for a private entitlement security permis-
sions [2] (com.apple.driver.AirPort.Broadcom.ioctl-
access) which requires a binary signed with an Apple pri-
vate key. It should be possible to overwrite the respective
permission-checking function in the driver using a kernel
extension patching framework such as [16] to restore un-
restricted ioctl access. Driver patching requires disabling
Apple’s System Integrity Protection [1].
Broadcom wl Utility. The Broadcom wl utility found in
the leaked source code provides several methods to access
internal information about AWDL operations, which are di-
rectly related to the structures found during binary analysis.
Although the AWDL-specific driver code was missing in the
leaked source code, the wl source code contains AWDL re-
lated commands and structures. wl allows us to query the
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current AWDL driver status using commands such as dump
awdl and awdl_advertisers. The latter shows information
about neighboring nodes including RSSI.
CoreCapture Framework.CoreCapture is Apple’s primary
logging and tracing framework for IEEE 802.11 on iOS and
macOS. CoreCapture combines raw protocol traces with tra-
ditional log entries and provides snapshots of the device and
driver state. CoreCapture is undocumented but was refer-
enced in a dumpPacket function that we found in the driver.
Since the framework outputs (among other logs and memory
dumps) numerous PCAP trace files with a custom header
format, we wrote aWireshark dissector for CoreCapture that
we make available to the public [23]. In addition, we publish
a manual for CoreCapture with this paper [22].
4 AWDL OVERVIEW
Based on our analysis, we formulate hypotheses regarding
the design goals and decisions of AWDL: (i) leverage existing
hardware (Wi-Fi chip), thus building the protocol on top of
IEEE 802.11; (ii) conserve energy, especially on mobile de-
vices, hence synchronizing and putting the Wi-Fi chip into a
power-saving mode during idle times; (iii) allow seamless
operation of direct and infrastructure-based communication,
so enable synchronized channel hopping without disconnect-
ing from an AP; and (iv) enable fast service discovery, thus
offloading DNS-SD to Wi-Fi frames. Commodity Wi-Fi chips
usually have a single RF chain and are, therefore, restricted to
a single wireless channel at any given time. To use multiple
channels, an adapter needs to switch channels and cannot
use the regular wireless connection for short periods of time.
This is expected behavior for roaming (scan for available
networks while being connected to a network) and power
saving features (switch off the radio). To use these short pe-
riods for data transfer, devices need a method for discovery
and coordination when to meet on which channel. We depict
the main AWDL phases in Fig. 3 and briefly introduce them
in the following.
(1) Activation. Apple uses AWDL as an on-demand commu-
nication technology. This means that AWDL is inactive by
default, but applications can (temporarily) request activation.
For example, AirDrop uses BLE for activation by sending
truncated hashes of the user’s contact information; AirPlay
receivers (Apple TV) constantly announce their presence via
AWDL; and third-party application may activate the inter-
face indirectly by advertising services via the NSNetService
API [6].
(2) Master Election. Apple uses fixed social channels (6, 44,
and 1493) for coordination using Periodic Synchronization
Frames (PSFs). A node starting its AWDL interface monitors
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Figure 3: The five main AWDL phases. Exemplary
trace showing a 100MiB file transfer via AirDrop in-
cluding activity on multiple channels and differenti-
ating the traffic types.
the social channels for some time to discover other nodes in
range. If AWDL Action Frames (AFs) are received, the node
can adopt an existing master. If no frames are received, it
assumes the master role itself. We elaborate on the election
process in Section 6.1.
(3) Synchronized Channel Sequences. AWDL is built
around a sequence of time slots (Availability Windows (AWs)
and Extended Availability Windows (EAWs)). For each of
these slots, peers broadcast if they are available for AWDL
data and, if so, on which channel they will be. Peers match
these advertisements with their own AW sequence. If there is
a common channel in a particular AW, communication dur-
ing this AW is possible. A synchronization mechanism aligns
the sequences between nodes. We elaborate on the synchro-
nization and channel alignment processes in Sections 6.2
and 6.3, respectively.
(4) ServiceDiscovery.DNS Service Discovery (DNS-SD) [18]
also known as “Bonjour” can be offloaded to AWDL. AWDL
piggy-backs DNS-SD responses directly onto its AFs such
that services are immediately discovered whenever a node
changes its advertisements. For space reasons, we do not
elaborate on the service discovery component in this paper.
(5) Data Transfer. AWDL uses a vendor-specific frame for-
mat header for user data which exclusively transports IPv6
packets. When transmitting user data to a particular peer, a
node needs to calculate the AWs during which both nodes are
tuned to the same channel and only transmit frames during
those AWs. In addition, AWDL adapts its channel sequence
according to the current outgoing traffic load. We discuss the
data transfer mechanisms in detail during the experimental
evaluation in Section 7.
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Figure 4: AWDL action frame.
5 FRAME FORMAT
We discovered two general frame types used by AWDL: ac-
tion and data frames which are used for coordination and
direct data transfer, respectively. We elaborate on the frame
format of these types in the following.
5.1 Action Frames
AWDL uses IEEE 802.11 vendor-specific AFs which gener-
ally allow vendors with an Organizational Unique Identifier
(OUI) to implement IEEE 802.11 frames with arbitrary pay-
loads [31]. The AWDL vendor-specific extension consists of
a fixed-sized header and multiple TLV fields as shown in
Fig. 4. A TLV consist of a 1-byte type field, followed by a
2-byte length field which indicates the length of the subse-
quent value byte string. The fixed header mostly includes
static values such as AWDL-specific BSSID, OUI, version, and
type. The two timestamps indicate when the frame was cre-
ated and, therefore, at which time the included information
was up-to-date (TTx,Target), and when it was actually queued
for transmission (TTx,PHY). Their difference approximates the
sender’s transmission delay and is used for synchronization
purposes. There are two AWDL AF subtypes: Periodic Syn-
chronization Frame (PSF) and Master Indication Frame (MIF).
These frame types start with the same fixed header and differ
only in the included set of TLVs and, hence, their size. We
show the frame format excluding the FCS at the end of the
frame in Fig. 4. We first explain the purpose of the subtypes
and then discuss TLVs used in AWDL.
Periodic Synchronization Frame (PSF). The PSF is used
for synchronization and is further explained in Chapter 6.2.
The name was gathered from a patent [33]. Its subtype is 0.
Table 1: TLVs used in AWDL.We give the name and type
value of a TLV, indicate whether it is included in PSFs or
MIFs (✓), and whether it can be present multiple times (+).
Name Type PSF MIF Purpose
Sync. Parameters 4 ✓ ✓
Election and
Synchronization
Channel Sequence 18 ✓ ✓
Election Parameters 5 ✓ ✓
Election Parameters v2 24 ✓ ✓
Synchronization Tree 20 ✓ ✓
Service Parameters 6 ✓ ✓ Service
Discovery
Service Response 2 ✓+
Arpa (Reverse DNS) 16 ✓
Data Path State 12 ✓ ✓ User Data
Transmission
HT Capabilities 7 ✓
VHT Capabilities 17 ✓
Version 21 ✓ ✓ Compatibility
If all participating devices support the 5 GHz band, the PSF
is the only frame type also seen on the 2.4 GHz band.
Broadcast Master Indication Frame (MIF). The MIF is
used for multiple purposes, e.g., election (Section 6.1) and
service discovery. It includes more TLVs and is sent by all
devices in the network regularly. The MIF subtype is 3.
TLVs. TLVs contain the actual control information. The dif-
ferent types can be attributed to one of the following pur-
poses: election and synchronization, service discovery, and
user data transmission. In addition, the version TLV provides
a 1-byte version number which presumably supersedes the
version field in the fixed header (see Fig. 4). We summarize
all TLVs in Table 1 and discuss them briefly in the following.
The names were taken from function names and debugging
strings found during binary analysis. We discuss only some
TLVs in detail in this paper, and refer to our Wireshark dis-
sector for the full specification. Note that some type values
(e. g. 1, 3, and 8) are missing in Table 1. These types appear
to be deprecated as they were not actively used in the AWDL
versions that we analyzed.
The election and synchronization processes handle the over-
all cooperation of the devices. The data in these TLVs de-
termines, e. g., which node takes the master role and which
channels are to be used. Curiously, the Synchronization Pa-
rameters TLV includes its own channel sequence, so the
separate Channel Sequence TLV appears to be redundant.
It was however always transmitted on current operating
system versions. This is further discussed in Sections 6.1
to 6.3. The service discovery components offload mDNS and
DNS-SD functionality to the AFs. They contain the hostname
(Arpa TLV); and PTR, SRV, and TXT resource records (Ser-
vice Response TLV). The user data transmission components
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Type/Subtype (Data) (as in Fig. 4)
}
802.11
DSAP (0xaa) SSAP (0xaa) Ctrl. (0x03) OUI
(00:17:f2) Protocol ID (0x0800)
 LLC
Magic Bytes (0x0304) Sequence Number
Reserved (0) EtherType (0x86dd)
 AWDL
Figure 5: AWDL data frame header.
are used to negotiate the parameters for direct connections
between devices. For example, supported PHY rates are an-
nounced in the HT/VHT Capabilities TLVs which are similar
to the ones introduced in the IEEE 802.11 n and 11 ac amend-
ments [31]. In addition, each peer announces in the Data
Path State TLV the Wi-Fi network (BSSID) that it is currently
connected to as well as the real MAC address of the Wi-Fi
chip. We believe that this information could be used to of-
fload an AWDL connection to an infrastructure network if
both peers are connected to the same network. However, this
would require additional reachability tests due to network
policies such as client isolation, and we did not observe such
behavior in practice. The version TLV includes the AWDL
version (half a byte for major and minor version number
each) as well as a device class ID. We found that v3.x is used
in macOS 10.13 and iOS 11; and v2.x in macOS 10.12 and
iOS 10 (and potentially prior iOS versions). AWDL v1.x is
used in macOS 10.11 which does not support the version TLV.
The device class seems to indicate the OS type of the node,
e. g., macOS (1) or iOS (2).
5.2 Data Frames
AWDL uses IEEE 802.11 data frames for user data transmis-
sion. The To-DS and From-DS flags are set to zero, similar to
IBSS which means that these frames are addressed directly,
and three address fields are used for the destination, source,
and BSSID. We depict the AWDL data frame format in Fig. 5.
The BSSID in AWDL frames is always 00:25:00:ff:94:73
which belongs to the OUI 00:25:00 that is assigned to Ap-
ple [20]. The LLC header contains a different Apple OUI
(00:17:f2) and a protocol ID in the SNAP part. These head-
ers are part of the IEEE 802 standard [30] and allow vendors
to implement their own protocols on higher layers. The ac-
tual AWDL data header essentially consists of a sequence
number and the EtherType of the transported protocol. We
identified IPv6 as the only protocol used with AWDL.
5.3 Addressing for Higher-Layer Protocols
AWDL is used in conjunction with higher-layer protocols.
Therefore, it needs some way to address AWDL nodes via a
network layer protocol. This is especially important because
AWDL implements privacy-enhancing MAC randomization
whichmeans that instead of using theWi-Fi chip’s fixedMAC
address, it generates a random address every time the inter-
face is activated. In IPv6, address resolution is usually done
via the Neighbor Discovery Protocol (NDP). Apple, however,
does not use NDP for AWDL, but instead generates link-local
IPv6 addresses from the source address field contained in the
AFs (Fig. 4) using a method described in RFC 4291 [19, Ap-
pendix A]. This method constructs a link-local IPv6 address
based on the 48-bit MAC address of the network interface. In
particular, given a 48-bit MAC address o0:o1:o2:o3:o4:o5,
the corresponding link-local IPv6 address is constructed as:
fe:80::o0^0x02:o1:o2:ff:fe:o3:o4:o5.
Using this standardized method, nodes can add their neigh-
bors to the neighbor table immediately after receiving the
first AF without the need or overhead of an additional ad-
dress resolution protocol such as NDP or ARP.
6 PROTOCOL OPERATION
We present the detailed mechanisms that are used to form
and maintain an AWDL cluster. In particular, we discuss how
a master is elected, and conflicts are resolved; how nodes
synchronize their clock to the master; and, finally, how the
announced channel sequence maps to the sequence of AWs.
6.1 Master Election
In this section, we explain the election process and the tree-
based synchronization structure. In particular, we focus on
the mechanisms that make AWDL robust to master nodes
leaving or joining the cluster.
Role of the Master Node. As already mentioned, AWDL
relies on roughly synchronous clocks of all participating
nodes in a cluster. To achieve this, it is paramount that there
is exactly one node in the cluster which has the responsibility
of emitting a “clock signal.” This is the one (and as far as we
know the only) role of the master node. All other nodes in
the cluster are called slaves and should adopt this signal. In
a simple scenario with only two nodes, one node will be the
master and another a slave. In larger scenarios, slave nodes
might be more than one hop away from the master node.
In such cases, intermediate slave nodes will take the role of
non-election masters, which have the responsibility to repeat
the master’s clock signal. The intermediate master nodes are
included in the Synchronization Tree TLV where each node
announces the path to the “top” master. In any case, there is
only one top master in a cluster.
MasterMetric. Themaster election is based on ametric field
which is included in the Election Parameters v2 TLV. The
node that announces the largest metric value will become the
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Figure 6: Synchronization Parameters TLV
master of that cluster. Apple’s patent [34] claims that these
metrics could be based on available energy resources, CPU
load, signal strength, etc. In practice, however, the metric is
simply chosen at random. A node that activates its AWDL
interface initially sets its metric field to 60 and listens on
the social channels for an existing master for 2 seconds.
If no master is found, it draws a random number from a
predefined range and sets this as its metric. We have found
that this range depends on the AWDL version, e. g., 405 to
436 in v2.x and 505 to 536 in v3.x. We assume that this is
done for backwards compatibility so that the master node is
guaranteed to be a node running the most up-to-date version
in a cluster and future protocol extensions can be supported.
Merging Clusters with Different Masters. When two al-
ready established AWDL clusters with different master nodes
move into proximity, they need to merge such that nodes in
the different clusters will be able to discover each other. In
AWDL, the process is straight-forward as all nodes advertise
their current master metric in the Election Parameters TLV.
If two nodes with different masters discover each other, they
receive the top master metric of the other cluster and can
immediately adopt the master with the higher metric. The
remaining nodes in the “lower” cluster then follow as soon
as the first node advertises the new master metric.
Loop Prevention.When creating such an election tree hi-
erarchy with multiple levels of sub-masters, loops may occur.
To prevent loops and limit the maximum depth of the elec-
tion tree, each AF contains a list of all nodes up to the top
master in the Synchronization Tree TLV. Each node can then
make sure that it does not adopt a non-election master if it
is already in that node’s path.
Re-Election. The initialization of a device using a low met-
ric will prevent most random re-elections when new devices
join the network. As there is no sign-off message, a master
leaving the network simply stops sending AFs. Therefore, a
missing master can only be detected by other devices after a
certain no master timeout which is fixed to 96 AWs (≈ 1.5 s).
Another node will then take the place of the old master. As
this node was already in sync with the old master, other
slave nodes do not need to re-synchronize but simply adopt
the new master. In other words, AWDL is robust to “master
churn,” i. e., a leaving master does not interrupt communi-
cation, and a new master is seamlessly adopted. This is in
contrast to other technologies such as Wi-Fi Direct, where
the respective master node essentially acts as an AP which
takes care of relaying data between two nodes and a leaving
master would require a group re-establishment.
The Role of RSSI. The RSSI values of received AFs are
used to filter out possibly unstable connections. In particular,
AWDL nodes drop frames when the RSSI is below a so-called
edge sync threshold which is set to -65 (or -78 if AirPlay is
used). Frames from the current master node are accepted
with a lower RSSI. These frames receive a bonus slave sync
threshold of 5. Lowering the threshold for the master frames
allows for a certain variance in the RSSI. We assume that
this was done to reduce “master flapping” where a node
frequently adopts a new master because it regularly drops
frames and the no master timeout occurs.
6.2 Synchronization
Synchronization is tightly coupled with the election process
since nodes always try to synchronize to their elected mas-
ter. In this section, we describe how time is structured in
AWDL and how nodes align their time reference with that
of their master. We introduce the concept of Availability
Windows (AWs), that is, short fixed-length time slots during
which communication is possible. These windows have a
static length, but can be extended using Extension Windows
(EWs). Finally, we show how the start of an AW is determined
using fields from the Synchronization Parameters TLV. We
summarize the key concepts and variables in Fig. 7.
AvailabilityWindow.AWs indicate a period of time during
which a device will be available for communication. These
windows need to be synchronous for all nodes in a cluster
such that every device starts an AW at the same time. Timing
in AWDL is based on Time Units (TUs) where 1 TU = 1024 µs
[31, page 141]. In the AWDL implementation, an AW is al-
ways set to be 16 TUs long. The length of an AW and all
other “static” values presented in this section are contained
in the Synchronization Parameters TLV. In theory, different
configurations are possible, but we found that only fixed
values are used.
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Figure 7: Structure of AWs andmapping to channel se-
quence.
Presence Mode and Extension Windows. For reduced
power consumption, a peer can indicate that it is not lis-
tening in every AW. A presence mode p of 4, which is the
only value used in Apple’s AWDL implementation, means
that a peer is only listening for every fourth window. If a
node is transmitting or receiving data, it may extend its time
spent on the channel. This is called an Extension Window
(EW). A presence mode of 4 leaves space for three EWs of 16
TUs. In addition, AWDL allows to configure different num-
bers of unicast, multicast, and AF EWs, but these fields are
currently always set to 3 and, thus, align with the presence
mode. Figure 6 shows the parameters transmitted in the Syn-
chronization Parameters TLV. Given the static configuration,
the effective smallest time unit in use is four consecutive
AWs/EWs. For the remainder of this paper, we use the term
ExtendedAvailabilityWindow (EAW) to refer to such a 64 TU
time slot.
Calculating the Start of an Availability Window. Each
slave node needs to synchronize its clock to that of its mas-
ter node. To achieve this, the master node announces the
start of the next AW. When transmitting an AF, the master
includes the number of TUs to the next EAW tAW as well as
the sequence number of the current AW or EW i . We mark
these values in red in Fig. 7.
As these values are set when the frame is created in the
driver, some time passes until the frame is actually trans-
mitted via the Wi-Fi interface. AWDL tries to compensate
for this transmitter delay by including two additional times-
tamps in the fixed header of each AF: the PHY and target
transmission times TTx,PHY and TTx,Target, respectively. Ide-
ally, TTx,Target is set when the frame is created, and TTx,PHY
just before the frame is transmitted via the interface. In the
macOS driver, however, both timestamps are set in the Wi-Fi
driver and, therefore, do not account for delays induced by
the distributed coordination function (DCF) which controls
medium access [31]. Nevertheless, a device receiving an AF
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30
Length c (15) Encoding Dup. Count step
Fill Channel (0xffff) Channel List (c entires)
. . .
Figure 8: Channel Sequence
from its master at time TRx can approximate the start of the
next AW TAW as follows:
TAW = tAW · 1024 − (TTx,PHY −TTx,Target) + tair +TRx. (1)
In fact, AWDL ignores the airtime tair since it is in the order
of sub-µs in a typical close-range Wi-Fi scenario, and the
accepted synchronization error is 3ms.4 We experimentally
evaluate the achievable accuracy in Section 7.
6.3 Channel Sequence
The AWDL channel sequence announcement builds upon the
synchronized AWs and indicates whether a node is actually
available for communication and, if so, on which channel
it has tuned its radio. In this section, we explain how the
channel sequence maps to the sequence of AWs.
The channel sequence maps channel numbers to AW se-
quence numbers. While the channel sequence included in the
TLVs shown in Fig. 8 contains a fixed number of c + 1 = 16
channel entries, the sequence can be prolonged with the
step field similar to the presence mode, so that one channel
entry can span multiple AWs and EWs.5 Setting step to 1
means that the channel will be active for one additional AW.
However, Apple always sets this field to 3, meaning that the
channel will be active for four AWs or one EAW. Thus, the
channel sequence is fully aligned to the presence mode in the
Synchronization Parameters TLV. Given an encoded channel
sequence and an AW sequence number i , an AWDL node can
calculate the currently active channel C for any peer based
on the following calculation:
C = i mod ((c + 1) · (step + 1)) (2)
As Apple uses fixed values for c and step, the announced
channel sequence covers (15+1)·(3+1) = 64AWswhich takes
about one second (64AW · 16TU/AW = 1048576 µs ≈ 1 s).
7 EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS
We analyze the runtime behavior of AWDL in different sce-
narios to (i) validate our findings of the previous sections
4In the function awdl_recv_action_frame, a misalign metric is increased
if the difference between a projection from a previous calculation and new
calculation of TAW is larger than 3ms.
5Note that the extension with step works only if the fill channel field is set
to 0xffff, which was the case in all our captured frames.
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and (ii) assess the performance of the protocol. First, we
describe our test setup. Then, we look at the master election
and synchronization accuracy in an idle scenario without
data transmissions. We further analyze the channel hopping
behavior and throughput performance.
7.1 Test Setup
Our test setup consists of one monitoring device and a num-
ber of Apple devices. Our monitor device is an APU board6
equipped with two QualcommAtheros QCA9882Wi-Fi cards
to support simultaneous sniffing on two different channels
which are tuned to AWDL’s primary (44) and secondary (6)
channel. Both Wi-Fi cards support hardware timestamping
which mitigates variable delays in the receiver’s OS stack. To
synchronize the internal clocks of the sniffing Wi-Fi chips,
we start each experiment with a calibration phase: we tune
both chips to a common channel and let them record multiple
frames. Post-experiment, we calculate the timestamp differ-
ence of frames that were received by both cards. We use the
median difference to correct the clock offset and align both
traces. All following experiments were conducted inside a
Faraday tent to minimize interference. Our test devices in-
clude an iPhone 8 (iOS 11.2.2), an iPad Pro 10.5" (iOS 11.0.3),
an iMac (Late 2012, macOS 10.12.6), and a MacBook Pro
(Late 2015, macOS 10.12.6).
7.2 Master Election
In our first experiment, we analyze the master election pro-
cess. We observe an AWDL cluster in an idle state, meaning
that no data transmission takes place and the only observed
frames are AFs. We use a setup consisting of an iPhone, iPad,
iMac, and MacBook. We activate the AWDL interface by se-
lecting the sharing panel in one device which causes a BLE
scan and activates the AWDL interface of other devices in
range (on iOS, this only works if the device is unlocked). To
get more interesting results, we let the different devices join
approximately 30 s after one another.
Figure 9 shows the currently selected master of each node.
First, the iMac creates the AWDL cluster and consequently se-
lects itself as the master. As soon as the iPhone joins, it takes
over the master role, and the iMac adopts it. The MacBook
runs the same version as the iMac and, thus, after having
discovered the AWDL cluster, it also adopts the iPhone as the
master node. The iPad briefly adopts the existing master, but
then immediately takes over this role as it selects a higher
self metric than the iPhone: Fig. 10 shows the current self
metric of each node over time. We show the initial value
of 60 and the implemented ranges for the different versions
of AWDL. Finally, all nodes successively leave the cluster
(Wi-Fi turned off) until only the MacBook remains. Since the
6https://pcengines.ch/apu.htm
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of AWDL.
iMac and the MacBook run an older version of AWDL, they
are only selected as master if none of the newer versions are
present in the cluster.
Most of these results were expected. What is interesting,
however, is that an already existing master node can be
“overtaken” by another node running the same version of
AWDL. This indicates that Apple’s AWDL implementation
is rather simplistic: each node keeps the initial self metric
only for a short period of time and then selects a higher
random value from the version-dependant range irrespective
of whether it has found an existing master or not.
7.3 Synchronization-to-Master Accuracy
We want to evaluate how well AWDL’s master election and
synchronization mechanism work. To this end, we monitor
the PSF and MIF exchanges between a number of different
nodes. We run another idle experiment over a longer pe-
riod of time (20 min) with three nodes. Figure 11 shows the
AW sequence number each node advertises. While Fig. 11
indicates that synchronization works in principle (all nodes
follow the same AW sequence number incline), we can see
that the AW sequence number steps are not perfectly aligned.
We are interested in the magnitude of this synchronization
offset. We adapt Eq. (1) to compute the synchronization error
ξ between a slave S and its master M. Assuming a con-
stant airtime tair and given two AFs from S and M with a
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sequence number in the same EAW recorded at the sniffer
at time TMRx and T
S
Rx, respectively, we calculate ξ as
ξ = TMAW −T
S
AW
=
(
tMAW − t
S
AW
)
· 1024 −
(
tMTx − t
S
Tx
)
+TMRx −T
S
Rx,
∀iS, iM with ⌊ iS
p
⌋ = ⌊
iM
p
⌋ .
(3)
In Fig. 12, we can see that the synchronization error approx-
imates a Gaussian distribution with a mean value of -0.45,
and a standard deviation of 0.98. Figure 12 also shows that
the target maximum synchronization error of 3 TUs is met
in more than 99 % of all cases.
While the results are within the target region, the rela-
tively large synchronization error leads to the conclusion
that only a portion of each EAW can reliably be used for com-
munication and the 3 TUs have to used as a guard interval.
In numbers, this means that only 1 − 2·3TU64TU ≈ 90.6% of the
interval can be used for communication. The main source of
synchronization error lies in the calculation of the transmis-
sion delay tTx. Equation (1) assumes thatTTx,PHY is set exactly
at the moment when the frame is being transmitted via the
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Wi-Fi radio after the frame has already been enqueued and
additional DCF back-offs have expired. However, we have
found that in macOS, TTx,PHY is set in the driver right after
the AF is created and before DCF has been run. We did not
analyze the implementation for other OSes but assume that
this is done at a similar location.
7.4 Channel Activity
We want to find out when AFs are usually transmitted. For
this, we consider the idle scenario from Section 7.2 again.
Figure 13 shows when frames (MIF and PSF) are transmitted
during an EAW by the different nodes. Each bin represents
a single AW (16 TU). We notice that MIFs are mostly sent
at the beginning of the first and second half of the entire
sequence. We also notice that there is a distinct difference
in the sending behavior of MIFs and PSFs. While MIF trans-
missions adhere to the advertised channel sequence, PSFs
are sent at any time. This is probably due to the AF period
in the Synchronization Parameters TLV (see Fig. 6) which
is either set to 110 or 440 TU and does not align with the
64 AWs that cover one channel sequence. We do not have a
solid explanation for this design decision but suspect that it
could accelerate the bootstrapping of new nodes which have
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Figure 15: Throughput measurements.
not yet synchronized to a master node. As a downside, this
means that nodes cannot really go to a power-conserving
mode in a non-advertised slot, which we assumed to be one
of the core design goals of AWDL. Another interesting aspect
is that PSFs are sent by all nodes, no matter if they are master
or not. This is another indicator that energy efficiency was
not a primary goal of AWDL. Otherwise, only the master
and sub-masters would send PSFs.
Figure 13 also shows that the PSFs constitute a certain
baseline “noise,” while the MIFs are sent especially during
the middle of one EAW. Figure 14 “zooms in” and depicts
the channel activity within a single EAWs. We see that MIF
activity is clustered around the center, while PSFs are sent
with equal probability over the entire EAW. We think that
MIFs are considered more important since they contain more
information than PSFs (see Table 1) and sending in the mid-
dle of an EAW increases the chance that a node receives a
transmission even if they are not perfectly synchronized.
7.5 Throughput and Channel Hopping
We want to evaluate the impact of AWDL’s channel hop-
ping on the throughput of a TCP connection. Unfortunately,
Apple drops packets for regular TCP and UDP servers that
directly bind to the awdl0 interface. This meant that running
measurement software such as iperf was not immediately
possible. As a solution, we built an AWDL–TCP proxy via the
NSNetService API [6] which whitelists the advertised port.
In essence, the proxy server advertises a service via DNS-
SD and listens for incoming TCP connections. The proxy
client component connects to it. Both proxy endpoints also
allow TCP connections via the loopback interface such that
regular TCP services can simply connect to the loopback
interface, and forward the TCP traffic via the NSNetService
connection. The proxy tool is available at [32].
TCP Throughput.We measure the throughput with iperf
using three different nodes (MacBook, iMac, and an AP) in
six different settings: (1) a single connection from MacBook
to the AP without AWDL; (2) a single connection from Mac-
Book to iMac via AWDL without the AP; (3) two concurrent
connections as a combination of (1) and (2), while the AP
operates on channel 44; and (4) as (3) but the AP operates on
channel 36. Our sniffer is configured as an AP in this scenario
which supports a maximum PHY data rate of 866.7Mbit/s
(MCS 9, two streams, 80MHz bandwidth). iMac and Mac-
Book both support three streams. Thus, we include another
measurement (5) where the iMac acts as the AP to see pos-
sible throughput differences between an AWDL and an AP
connection using the same hardware. Finally, we include
(6) a comparison to IEEE 802.11 IBSS mode. We repeat each
10-second experiment 50 times for each setting and show
the results in Fig. 15. The error bars indicate the standard
deviation. The only AWDL and only AP (iMac) settings result
in similar throughput demonstrating that bandwidth is only
limited by the hardware capabilities of the communicating
nodes. Note that the only IBSS (iMac) setting performs 10–
12 % worse than the previous two settings: we observed that
the MCS selection mechanism for IBSS on macOS is erratic
and does not always choose the maximum supported values
even when the signal-to-noise ratio is high. The Qualcomm
Wi-Fi chips in the APU only support two streams, so the
maximum bandwidth is reduced by approximately 30 %. The
cumulative throughput when the AP operates on channel
44 (same) is similar to the throughput of the only AP setting
while the bandwidth between the two connections is uni-
formly distributed.When the AP operates on a different chan-
nel, the cumulative throughput drops by about 13%. This
confirms the intuitive assumption that channel switching
affects throughput negatively. We are surprised to see that
the bandwidth is no longer uniformly distributed between
the two streams. Instead, AWDL has a higher throughput
which could be caused by AWDL resorting to using all three
available streams.
Channel Hopping.We found that AWDL adopts its chan-
nel sequence according to the traffic volume on the interface.
When there is no traffic (such as in the idle scenario), AWDL
allocates at least 25 % of the channel sequence to the social
channels (see slots 1, 9, 10, and 11 in Fig. 13). As the load
increases, AWDL may allocate all EAWs for itself. We depict
the various channel allocation states in Table 2.7 The table
shows that (1) at least 25 % of the time is allocated for AWDL
(low power state), (2) there is always a switch to channel 6
in slot 9 possibly for backward compatibility, and (3) at least
25 % of the time is reserved for the AP connection if the node
is connected to an AP. In our throughput experiment, either
the data or the data+infra (50 %) state was active.
7We found references for 25 states in total (including a real-time mode and
different combinations) during binary analysis, which we will not further
discuss in this paper.
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Table 2: A subset of AWDL states and corresponding
channel list where p and s are the primary (44) and sec-
ondary (6) AWDL channels, respectively, and i is the
channel of the AP.
State Airtime Channel List (c = 16)
Low Power 25.0 % p s p p
Idle 37.5 % p p p s p p
Data+Infra 50.0 % p p p p i i i i s p p p i i i i75.0 % p p p p p p i i s p p p p p i i
Data 100.0 % p p p p p p p p s p p p p p p p
8 DISCUSSION
In this section, we discuss AWDL complexity and overhead,
energy efficiency, and conduct an initial security assessment
of AWDL and its OS integration.
8.1 Complexity and Overhead
AWDL has a complex protocol definition that supports vari-
ous configurations using AWs and EWs. We were surprised
to see that Apple settled for a static and rather simple config-
uration, making the complex concepts obsolete. In addition,
we found a lot of redundant information that bloats the size
of the AWDL AFs.
(Extended)AvailabilityWindows.AWDL, as implemented
in current OSes, allows for highly configurable operation con-
figurations (see Synchronization Parameters TLV in Fig. 6).
However, all current implementations use a fixed channel
sequence length of 16 and do not differentiate between AWs
and EWs but exclusively use the longer EAWs (compare
Fig. 7). The reason why Apple prefers EAWs might have
to do with the time that is required to perform a channel
switch operation in the Wi-Fi chip. We found that a chan-
nel switch operation takes at least 8ms (≈ 8 TU) using dump
chanswitch of the wl utility. In combination with a guard
interval that is necessary to cope with the accepted synchro-
nization error of 3 TU, this would leave only 2 TU airtime for
communication assuming that the EWs are reserved for an
energy conserving sleep state. When using EAWs, the tempo-
ral efficiency increases from about 12.5 % to more than 78 %
while sacrificing opportunities to save energy. We visualize
this difference in Fig. 16.
Redundancy. AWDL AFs contain redundant information
such as the current master address which is announced in
the Synchronization Parameters, Election Parameters, and
Election Parameters v2 TLVs. The Service Response Parame-
ters TLV often encode the same information multiple times
such that the service instance string and device name be seen
three times in a frame when AirDrop is active.
EW EWAW EW
Extended Availability Window (EAW)
Channel switch Guard interval ActivitySleep
Figure 16: Time spent for channel switching, guard in-
terval, and resulting airtime that can be used for com-
munication when using AWs/EWs vs. EAWs.
8.2 Energy Efficiency
Our working hypothesis was that energy efficiency was one
of the primary design goals of AWDL (compare Section 4).
The insights obtained from our experimental analysis do
not support this hypothesis. We have found that even in the
so-called low power state, AWDL is active for at least 25 % of
the time during which the Wi-Fi chip is active. In addition,
all nodes and not only the master send PSFs. We suspect that
energy efficiency was sacrificed for a more reliable opera-
tion: the exclusive use of long EAWs makes the system more
robust against synchronization error. As all nodes send PSFs,
new nodes can discover an existing AWDL cluster faster.
8.3 Security
AWDL connections are completely unsecured. However, Ap-
ple employs a default packet filter that prevents services to
listen on the AWDL interface accidentally. We further found
and reported a vulnerability in the macOS driver interface.
Open AWDL Connection.We have found that AWDL con-
nections do not feature any security mechanism. All action
and data frames are sent in plain and without authentication.
AWDL delegates security functions to the transport and ap-
plication layer, e. g., AirDrop uses TLS 1.2 [5]. The approach
appears to be an informed decision to implement application-
dependant policies: a device might be trusted for sending
an image file via AirDrop, but not for remote-controlling a
Keynote presentation.
Default Packet Filter. While an AWDL connection can be
considered insecure, Apple made sure that other services
such as file sharing are not advertised via the awdl0 inter-
face which would otherwise be accessible by unauthenti-
cated nearby adversaries. Developers need to explicitly use
a dedicated API (e. g., NSNetService) to opt-in for the use
of AWDL which we did to implement our TCP proxy. The
packet filter is apparently not part of the standard macOS
firewall but probably implemented in NSNetService. Also,
the awdl0 interface is activated only on demand and deac-
tivated once no more traffic is registered, thus, minimizing
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the time window for an attack. This could be considered an
“accidental” security mechanism because the main reason for
the timeout was probably energy conservation.
VulnerableDriver Interface.The ioctl interface described
in Section 3.1, especially including the card-specific com-
mand used for the Broadcom wl utility, could be used by any
local user on macOS. The issue was reported to Apple on
July 19, 2017, and was assigned CVE-2017-13886. Apple has
fixed this issue on December 6, 2017, and published the CVE
entry on May 2, 2018 [3].
9 CONCLUSION
We reconstructed the frame format and the operation of
AWDL, a complex undocumented protocol and complemented
our findings with an open source Wireshark dissector. We
believe that public knowledge of such wide-spread propri-
etary protocols is vital to assist wireless network operators
and to allow independent security audits as well as to stim-
ulate innovation and research below the application layer.
We experimentally evaluated AWDL and showed that the
synchronization accuracy is about -0.45ms on average. The
maximum achievable throughput is only limited by the de-
vices’ supported PHY data rates if the nodes are not actively
using an infrastructure network. If channel switching is re-
quired, the cumulative throughput of two concurrent con-
nections drops by about 13 %. We have found a security bug
which allowed any local user to access the macOS Wi-Fi dri-
ver interface. In the light of recent over-the-air exploitable
IEEE 802.11 implementations [9], we suspect that there are
even more vulnerabilities to be found given the complexity
of the AWDL protocol. As future work, we will direct our
efforts towards an energy model for AWDL to understand
the implications when using AWDL as a drop-in replace-
ment for BLE or IEEE 802.11 IBSS in ad hoc communication
applications.
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